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Abstract
The ongoing demographic change is expected to negatively affect
the effective labor supply of various developed countries. In order to
counteract these developments, many suggested policy measures tar-
get the participation rate of women and old workers. In this paper, I
develop a multi-sectoral CGE-OLG model where workers of different
ages and skills are assumed to be imperfect substitutes and calibrate
it to the Swiss economy. I use this model to evaluate the effects of
the demographic change on the Swiss labor market and the potential
of reforms targeting different participation rates. I find that a yearly
decrease of old workers’ preference towards leisure by 2% between 2022
and 2030 yields macroeconomic results that are comparable to an in-
crease in the statutory retirement age by 2 years. While the increase
of the retirement age succeeds in increasing net income by more than
both participation rate increases, it also leads to an increase in wage
levels and thereby labor shortages. This result highlights the impor-
tance of reducing scarcity on the labor markets for macroeconomic
performance and shows the potential of reforms targeting labor mar-
ket participation.
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1 Introduction
Population aging is an issue that needs to be addressed by public policy in most
industrialized countries. For example, in Switzerland the old age dependency ratio,
i.e. the ratio of the retired to the working age population, is expected to increase
from 31.1% in 2020 to 39.6% in 2030 and further increase up to almost 50% by
2050. As the baby-boomer generation retires in the coming years, the country will
experience a drastic reduction of the labor force. To illustrate this shock, Figure 1
shows the projected number of 20- and 65-year olds, i.e. an approximation of the
number of potential domestic workers entering and leaving the labor market, as
well as the projected old age dependency ratio. For the whole observation period
after the year 2020, the number of 65-year-olds exceeds the number of 20-year-olds,
meaning that Switzerland is relying solely on foreign workers to keep the labor
force constant. Barring fundamental changes of production technologies (such as
for example a rapid increase in the use of robotics), this is bound to lead to massive
labor shortages, especially due to similar demographic trends in all geographically
nearby countries. In order to temper the effects of the demographic transition,
the government can attempt to increase the labor force participation rate of the
working age population, raise the statutory retirement age, increase net immigration
or, in the longer term, increase fertility. In this paper, I evaluate and compare the
effectiveness of possible reforms targeting the supply of labor in Switzerland with
respect to labor shortages but also general economic performance.
Figure 1: Demographic Trends in Switzerland
Note: Model projections based on reference scenario of the official projec-
tions by the Swiss Statistical Office Federal Statistical Office (2020).
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Due to their generally lower participation rates, in particular women and older work-
ers are potential targets for participation rate increases. On average, women start
reducing their labor supply around the age of 28, mainly due to pregnancy and
child rearing. A typical reform targeting the participation rate of women would
therefore improve childcare assistance. Old workers decrease their labor supply
mainly due to health issues or early retirement schemes. Making such schemes rel-
atively less attractive or improving working conditions could therefore increase the
labor supply of old workers. However, the evaluation of potential macroeconomic
effects of such reforms is not straight-forward. During the demographic transition,
many forces affect the choice of an individual’s labor supply. As the pension system
becomes less sustainable, higher savings or contributions to a pay-as you-go pen-
sion are required to secure a post-retirement income. At the same time, wages are
expected to increase as labor becomes more scarce. However relative wages for old
workers might decrease as old workers become relatively more abundant. The net
effect on labor supply of workers of different ages is not clear even without taking
into consideration possible policies targeting the labor supply.
In order to address this issue I develop a computable general equilibrium model with
overlapping generations and calibrate it to Switzerland. This allows me to evaluate
the consequences of the demographic transition on the Swiss labor market in a gen-
eral equilibrium context. It also allows me to impose different reforms targeting the
labor supply of different groups, such as women, old workers or migrants, and com-
pare the macroeconomic effects of such a reform to other potential measures, such
as an increase in fertility or the retirement age. To allow for a detailed analysis of
distributional effects, the model is disaggregated into 79 generations (representing
ages 20-99) and four skill levels on the household side, whereas firms distinguish
between workers of the four skill levels and four age groups, i.e. young workers,
middle-aged workers, old workers and workers above the statutory retirement age.
This imperfect substitutability between age groups is based on a diverse range of
evidence (see e.g. Hamermesh, 2001; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Buchmann, 2020;
Mérette, 2007) and allows for a more realistic modeling of participation rates over
the life cycle during the demographic transition. Additionally, the model is disag-
gregated into eight sectors. Households imperfectly substitute their labor supply
between the sectors. Combined with the skill levels this allows for an approximation
of occupation- and sector-specific labor shortages. It also enables an evaluation of
distributional effects of different policies on a sectoral level.
This paper contributes to the long list of OLG models in the style of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987). Some of the most prominent examples include, among others,
Altig et al. (2001), De Nardi et al. (1999) or Kotlikoff et al. (2007). For an extensive
overview of this literature see Fehr et al. (2013). Most of these models focus on fiscal
reforms or reforms of pension and social security systems. In this paper, I focus on
the labor market instead. In this respect, I follow a growing strand of the literature
such as for example Börsch-Supan (2003), Fougère et al. (2007) or Lisenkova et al.
(2013). The model presented in this paper partially builds on Fougère et al. (2007)
who develop a model which is disaggregated into seven generations, 14 sectors,
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three types of labor, ten occupational groups and five qualification levels and use
this model to analyze the effects of population aging and its induced changes in
final-demand on the sectoral composition of the Canadian economy. Their results
highlight the growing importance of health services and the need for the wages
in that sector to increase to avoid labor shortages. Mérette (2007) suggests the
introduction of imperfect substitutability between age groups into OLG modeling.
His results show how age-specific wages can lead to interesting incentives concerning
early retirement. This idea is also picked up in the model presented here.
The OLG literature regarding Switzerland is relatively sparse. Müller et al. (2003)
develop the OLG model SWISSOLG to evaluate alternative funding schemes for
the Swiss pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme. In Müller et al. (2006) SWIS-
SOLG is extended to analyze fiscal reforms. Bütler (2000) develops an OLG model
with exogenous factor prices in order to evaluate the political feasibility of differ-
ent pension reforms in Switzerland. Keuschnigg et al. (2011) develop a Blanchard
(1985) style OLG model of the Swiss economy with a detailed labor market com-
ponent, including search frictions. They use the model to evaluate the potential
of policy reforms such as an increase in the retirement age or a reform of the pen-
sion system. Hauser et al. (2020) develop an OLG model in the Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) tradition and evaluate the effects of demographic change on the
growth of the Swiss economy. They consider different forecast scenarios which also
include scenarios with an increased participation rate of women and old workers,
both of which are among the most positive scenarios considered, in terms of GDP
per capita.
As to my knowledge, apart from Hauser et al. (2020), at the time of writing this
paper there exist no major CGE-OLG models which explicitly analyze the macroe-
conomic effects of successful labor market participation reforms. Therefore, this
papers’ main contribution is the introduction of such a reform into academic OLG
modeling. Furthermore, the paper contributes to the literature on labor market
effects of demographic change by introducing imperfect substitutability across age
groups and it contributes to the small but growing literature of Swiss OLG models
by introducing a sectoral dimension and making use of the most recent data and
forecasts.
The results of my model show that demographic change will negatively affect the
Swiss economy, especially after 2030. GDP per capita is shrinking by 3.5% until
2070 and contribution rates to the pension system will have to almost double from
8.6% to 14.9% to keep the pension system sustainable at current levels. Due to
different consumption preferences of older households, the relative importance of
the health sector will increase from 5.9% of GDP to 6.3% of GDP, while the impor-
tance of the construction sector decreases from 6.8% to 6%. Almost all sectors are
expected to experience noticeable labor shortages, especially for young and middle
aged workers. This is manifested by wage rate increases of up to 20%. The health
sector is particularly affected by these wage increases.
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I implement positive participation rate shocks by gradually decreasing the pref-
erence towards leisure in some consumers’ utility functions. I find that, in terms
of GDP per capita, an annual decrease of this parameter by 2% for workers aged
50-64 between the years of 2022 and 2030 is roughly equivalent to an immediate
and permanent increase of the statutory retirement age by 2 years and more effi-
cient than realistic increases in net immigration or fertility rates. This adjustment
corresponds to a total increase in full-time-equivalent participation rates by three
to ten percentage points, depending on the exact age of the household. A corre-
sponding participation rate increase for women yields marginally worse, but still
very similar outcomes. Both increases of participation rates result in a reduction
of wages, indicating a reduction of labor shortages. In terms of the sustainability
of the pension system and consumers’ disposable incomes, an increase in the re-
tirement age is still much preferable. In this respect, it is even more striking that
the participation rate reforms achieve similar results in terms of GDP per capita.
These results highlight the potential of reforms targeting participation rates and
the importance of reducing labor shortages.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I briefly introduce
the most important components of the model. In Section 3 I introduce the data
sources and explain the calibration process. In Section 4 I present and then compare
the simulation results of the baseline scenario, as well as the participation rate
and retirement age reforms. In Section 5 I analyze the sensitivity of my results
with respect to assumed parameters as well as alternative demographic scenarios.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Producers
The model is disaggregated into 8 sectors s. Firms use a fixed share of intermediate
inputs I which are combined with a Cobb-Douglas combination of labor L and
capital K to produce output Y . Production technologies are therefore represented
by the following production function:
Ys,t =
As,t
1− αIs
K
αKs
s,t L
1−αKs
s,t , (1)
where A is total factor productivity, αI is the fixed share of intermediate inputs
and αK is the Cobb-Douglas-parameter for capital. Labor is further disaggregated
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into 4 skill levels q1, determined by a CES function:
Ls,t =
(∑
q
αQs,q(L
Q
s,q,t)
σ
Q
s −1
σ
Q
s
) σQs
σ
Q
s −1
, (2)
where σQ is the elasticity of substitution between differently skilled labor and αQ
is the firms preference parameter for labor with qualification Q. Skill-specific labor
supply is further disaggregated into age-group-specific labor supply LAQ:
LQs,q,t =
(∑
a
αAa,s,q(L
AQ
a,s,q,t)
σAs −1
σAs
) σAs
σAs −1
, (3)
where σA is the elasticity of substitution between labor from different age groups
and αA is the firms preference parameter for labor from different age groups.
2.2 Consumers
The model contains 79 overlapping generations g, where each generation corre-
sponds to one year of age. Consumers are economically born at age 20. Every
period, they face a chance of dying, defined by the survival rate S. At the age of 99
they die with certainty. I do not assume a bequest motive, however, as households
die unexpectedly their remaining savings B are redistributed to all other house-
holds in the form of unplanned bequests U . As in Imrohoroglu (1998), I assume
that unplanned bequests are redistributed equally to all remaining households in
a lump-sum fashion. Consumers are further disaggregated into 4 skill levels q.
As is common in the literature, lifetime utility is assumed to be a time-separable
CES function, such that in every period, consumers maximize their utility over
consumption C and leisure `. Expected lifetime utility is given by:
Et [Uq] =
79∑
i=0
{
1
(1 + γ)i
(
k=i∏
k=0
Sg+k,t+k
)
u(Cq,g,t, `q,g,t)
}
, (4)
where γ is the rate of time preference which is assumed to be identical across all
households. One-period utility u(C, `) is given by:
u(Cq,g,t, `q,g,t) =
1
1− 1ρ
(
C
1− 1θ
q,g,t + αq,g,t`
1− 1θ
q,g,t
) 1− 1ρ
1− 1
θ , (5)
where ρ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ is the intratemporal elas-
ticity of substitution and α is the utility weight on leisure.
1The choice of distinguishing between four levels of skill is based on Buchmann (2020).
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The households’ labor income ψ is defined as follows:
ψq,g,t = wq,a,tξq,a,tεq,g,t(1− `q,g,t), (6)
where w is the age-group specific sectorally aggregated wage rate, ξ is an age group
and qualification level specific time endowment parameter, ε is an age and qualifi-
cation level efficiency parameter, and ` is the share of time devoted to leisure (i.e.
1− ` corresponds to the full-time-equivalent participation rate).
The households’ intertemporal budget constraint is given by the following equation:
PCq,t,g(1 + τ
C)Cq,t,g +Bq,t+1,g+1 − (Bq,t,g + Uq,t,g) =
(1− τWt − CTRt)ψq,g,t + it(1− τK)(Bq,t,g + Uq,t,g) + Pq,t,g, (7)
where PC is the price of the households’ consumption basket, C is the level of
consumption, B are the households’ savings, P is the received PAYG pension pay-
ment (only nonzero for households above the statutory retirement age), CTR is the
contribution rate to the PAYG pension system, i is the interest rate and τC , τW
and τK are consumption, wage and capital tax rates.
Similar to, for example, Magnani and Mercenier (2009), each representative con-
sumer chooses to allocate their working time among the sectors, maximizing their
total income under a CET constraint:
LSq,a,t =
(∑
s
αSa,s,q(LSSs,q,a.t)
1−σL
σL
) σL
1−σL
. (8)
2.3 Government and other Markets
A relatively small pay as you go pension system represents the Swiss Old-age and
survivor’s insurance (OASI). The size of pension payments is based on the mean
of the households’ lifetime income, multiplied with a fixed replacement rate R.
Contributions to the pension are deducted from workers’ labor income, with a
contribution rate CTR chosen in every period such that the pension payments can
be financed fully.
The economy is assumed to be linked to the world market via imports and exports.
However, the rest of the world is not modeled explicitly. The aggregate trade bal-
ance is assumed to remain constant, world market prices adjust to reflect this. The
government raises taxes on income, consumption and capital, from which it finances
its expenditures. Expenditures are allocated to the sectors by a CES function and
are assumed to grow at the same rate as the population. The government is allowed
to run a deficit, however in the long run the budget is assumed to be balanced.
A complete list of model equations is presented in Appendix A.
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3 Data and Calibration
As recommended by Buchmann (2020), the four skill levels are defined by com-
petence levels, which in turn are based on occupations. For a full description of
the competence levels and their advantages over more traditional definitions of skill
levels, see Buchmann (2020). The age groups are defined as follows: young work-
ers are ages 20-34, middle-aged workers are ages 35-49, old workers are ages 50-64
and post-retirement-age workers are ages 65-79. Households over the age of 79 are
assumed to be retired completely, reflecting the fact that observed participation
rates are almost zero at this age. The aggregation of sectors is based on the Gen-
eral Classification of Economic Activities (NOGA) of the Swiss Federal Statistical
Office (SFSO). Table 9 lists the aggregation of NOGA industry sections into the
model sectors.
Initially, the economy is assumed to be in a steady state in 2010. After 2010, the
demographic shock is implemented. I report model results from 2020 onwards,
giving the model 10 periods to react to the initial shock and move to its transition
path. All demographics starting in 2020 are based on the official projections of the
Federal Statistical Office (2020). The size of the 20-year-old cohort is taken directly
from the projections. Combined with the projected mortality rates and migration
movements, the model replicates the complete projected demographics until 2070.
After 2070, fertility, mortality, and migration are assumed to remain constant at the
2070 level, leading to a stable population size in the long run. A new steady state
is enforced in the year 2200. Migration is not assumed to be equally distributed
among skill levels. Instead the current skill levels of migrants are assumed to remain
unchanged during the demographic transition. This distribution is based on the
Swiss Labor Force Survey and displayed in Table 1. As migrants are more likely
to be very high or low skilled than Swiss, this leads to an increase in the relative
abundance of very high and low skilled workers.
Participation rates are represented by the leisure parameter `. Steady state par-
ticipation rates are chosen such that the model replicates the full-time-equivalent
participation rates 2015-2017 as calculated by the SFSO as closely as possible in
the period 2015. The utility weight on leisure α can then be calibrated based on the
steady-state values for `. Figure 2 compares the full-time-equivalent participation
rates as observed by the SFSO to the calibrated participation rates 1 − ` in 2015.
The calibration comes fairly close to real values, with the exception of workers
above the statutory retirement age. Here, the model predicts higher participation
rates than observed in the data. However, those participation rates are still very
low.
The efficiency parameter ε is estimated with data from the 2015 Swiss Labor Force
Survey using a simple Mincer (1958) style wage equation, regressing log wages on
age, age-squared and sex in each qualification level.
The industry structure, i.e. intermediate inputs, export and import shares, capital
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Table 1: Distribution of qualification levels
Very High Skilled High Skilled Medium Skilled Low Skilled
Swiss 33% 20% 43% 4%
Migrants 49% 13% 33% 5%
Source: Swiss Labor Force Survey 2015
Figure 2: Calibrated versus observed participation rates
Note: Simulated value of (1 − `) in 2015 versus full-time-equivalent par-
ticipation rates 2015-2017 as calculated by the SFSO, based on the Swiss
Labor Force Survey. X-axis corresponds to age in years.
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shares and final use of the produced goods is calibrated with the Swiss Input-Output
Table 2014 (SFSO, 2018). The shares of the different types of labor (i.e. skill and
age groups) in each industry are calibrated using the Swiss Labor Force Survey
2015. ξ is then calibrated such that labor supply in efficiency-units matches labor
demand for each skill and age group. Figure 3 displays the simulated steady-state
income and consumption profiles.
Figure 3: Consumption and Income Profiles
Note: Simulated income and consumption profiles. Income includes labor
income ψ, capital income rB and transfer income P and U . X-axis corre-
sponds to age in years. Y-axis corresponds to Swiss Franks in thousand.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 0.9. This value is
higher than what is usually assumed in the literature, however, this elasticity in
combination with the given mortalities and relatively high number of old gener-
ations best replicates the observed life-cycle consumption pattern. A lower value
would vastly overestimate the consumption of the older generations. In Section 5
I show how the results of the model change if a more common elasticity is chosen.
Martinez et al. (2018) find very low Frisch elasticities for Switzerland. To account
for this observation, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is assumed to be
equal to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The annual depreciation rate
δ is assumed to be 0.05. Based on the inter- and intratemporal elasticities and δ,
the rate of time preference γ is calibrated to be 0.031 and the steady state interest
rate is calibrated as 0.08.
The labor market elasticities σQ and σA are set to 3 and 3.6, respectively. This
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assumption is based on Buchmann (2020) where, using the same data, I estimate
an aggregate elasticity of substitution between skill levels of 2.8, with sectoral elas-
ticities generally being slightly higher, and an elasticity of substitution between
the appropriate age groups of 3.624. As I do not find robust differences between
sectors, I assume the same elasticities across all sectors. The elasticity of transfor-
mation between sectoral employment σL is assumed to be -1.5. I assume a fairly low
transformability since the number of sectors is relatively low and therefore sectors
should not be very similar. Magnani and Mercenier (2009) generate elasticities in
the same range for the choice of occupation. The sensitivity of model outcomes to
this parameter choice is evaluated in Section 5.
Table 2: Exogenous Parameter Values
Symbol Definition Value
ρ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.9
θ Intratemporal elasticity of substitution 0.9
δ Depreciation rate 0.05
R Replacement rate 0.31
τC Consumption tax rate 0.042
τW Income tax rate 0.384
τK Capital tax rate 0.018
σQ Elasticity of substitution between skill levels 3
σA Elasticity of substitution between age groups 3.6
σL Elasticity of transformation between sectoral employment -1.5
σI Elasticity of substitution between origin of investment 3
σG Elasticity of substitution between sectoral government spending 2.5
σM Armington Elasticity between origin of consumption 1.5
σX Armington Elasticity between destination of production -1.5
The pension system is based on a simplified version of the first pillar of the Swiss
pension system OASI (Old Age and Survivor Insurance). This is a state run, pay-as-
you-go pension scheme, partially also financed by various taxes (e.g. VAT, tobacco,
gambling). For the purposes of this model, I neglect the external financing of the
pension and only model the wage contribution. I choose the pensions’ replacement
rate R such that the resulting steady-state contribution rate CTR matches the true
wage contribution rate of 8.7%. The resulting replacement rate is 0.31. The second
(mandatory pension fund) and third (voluntary tax-deductible pension fund) pillar
of the pension system are not modeled explicitly.
11
4 Results
4.1 Demographic Transition
First, I present results for the baseline model, i.e. the effects of the demographic
shock alone. The effect of the demographic transition on different macroeconomic
variables is summarized in Table 3. Where applicable, results represent percentage
changes compared to 2020 measured per working age population. GDP per capita
first stagnates until around 2040 and then starts falling as the demographic pressure
increases. The capital stock keeps growing for a longer time as a consequence of the
labor shortage and the implied shift from labor to capital in the production of goods.
Meanwhile, the share of consumption is increasing while the share of investments
is decreasing. The relative abundance of capital also leads to a consistently falling
interest rate. The tax burden decreases initially, however during the second half of
the transition the tax burden starts increasing again, reflecting the decrease of per
capita income. The contribution rate to the PAYG pension system has to increase
drastically in order to finance the larger amount of retirees.
Table 3: Macroeconomic Results of Baseline Model
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
GDPa 1.000 1.012 1.001 0.991 0.978 0.965
Capital Stocka 1.000 1.045 1.059 1.058 1.048 1.030
Share of Investmentb 0.319 0.310 0.294 0.283 0.275 0.271
Share of Consumptionb 0.551 0.561 0.576 0.585 0.591 0.595
Interest Rate 0.072 0.069 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.067
Income Tax rate 0.329 0.321 0.325 0.330 0.335 0.341
Contribution Rate 0.086 0.100 0.115 0.126 0.140 0.149
a Measured per capita (aged 20 and above) and indexed at 1 in 2020
b Share relative to total GDP
Table 4 shows the share of each sectors’ output on aggregate output at different
points in time. Most affected are the sector aggregates construction and health.
Construction’s share of output decreases by 12% from 6.81% to 6%, whereas health’s
share of output increases from 5.96% to 6.27%, or 5%. Other losers include manu-
facturing, IT and agriculture while other sectors who are relatively better off after
the demographic transition include finance, trade & transport and other services.
Figure 4 shows how the participation rates (1 − `) of differently aged households
change during the demographic transition. Participation rates of younger and
middle-aged workers only marginally change during the transition, despite largely
increasing wage levels. However, older households noticeably react to the changing
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Table 4: Sectoral Impact of Population Aging
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Manufacturing 29.82 29.82 29.67 29.58 29.52 29.46
Finance 20.82 21.11 21.27 21.33 21.36 21.33
Construction 6.81 6.58 6.32 6.16 6.06 6.00
Trade and Transport 18.41 18.48 18.57 18.64 18.70 18.72
IT 4.39 4.36 4.31 4.26 4.23 4.21
Other Services 12.76 12.65 12.75 12.84 12.92 13.00
Health 5.96 5.98 6.10 6.17 6.21 6.27
Agriculture 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00
Shares of sectoral output relative to aggregate output, in %.
circumstances. 60 year-olds initially increase their labor supply, as older workers
(aged 50-64) become relatively more scarce due to the retirement of the baby-
boomer generation. After 2030, when the largest part of the baby-boomers is
retired, labor supply of older workers remains constant until 2045 when the sec-
ond wave of the demographic transition hits and old labor becomes even more
scarce, which leads to another increase in participation rates. Workers above the
retirement age, here represented by 65 year-olds, slightly increase their labor sup-
ply initially but, due to the relative abundance of workers in this age group and
thereby falling wages, start decreasing it once the baby-boomers are retired. After
the baby-boomers leave this age bracket, labor supply is increased again before it
falls once again as the second wave of the transition completes. In all age brack-
ets, the differences between qualification levels are caused by qualification-specific
immigration which changes the relative scarcity of qualified labor and therefore
relative wages and incentives to change labor supply.
As a measure for labor shortages, Table 10 in the Appendix displays the develop-
ment of the disaggregated wage rates relative to 2020. As a first observation it is
clear that wages for the middle two qualification levels increase more than the wages
of the very high- and low-skilled workers. Again, this is due to the composition of
immigration which increases the relative scarcity of the medium qualification levels.
It is also notable that wages in the health sector increase rapidly and strongly. This
indicates a high chance of labor shortages in this sector in the coming decade. While
the wages in the health sector show the sharpest increase, wages for young and mid-
dle aged workers increase in all sectors to varying degrees. Wages for old workers
only show strong increases in the medium qualification levels, high- and low-skilled
old workers experience much more moderate wage increases. Post-retirement-age
workers only experience notable wage increases in the health sector, in all other
sector wages stagnate or even fall. This is a sign of the relative abundance of
post-retirement workers during the demographic transition.
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Figure 4: Participation rates of differently aged households during the de-
mographic transition
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4.2 Increasing participation rates of old workers
I now turn to the first policy reform. This reform represents a successful increase in
the participation rate of workers between the age of 50 and 64. This paper remains
agnostic about how this increase was achieved. Potential reforms could include
incentives for a delayed early retirement or incentives for firms to hire older work-
ers. Within the model, the reform is implemented by incrementally decreasing the
preference parameter for leisure α by 2% every year between 2021 and 2030. This
corresponds to a final increase in the participation rates of around 7%, however the
exact increase depends on the initial participation rates, i.e. generations who par-
ticipated less initially are affected more strongly. Figure 5 shows how participation
rates are affected for a range of age groups. The shocks result in participation rate
increases between 4% and over 10%, depending on the exact age.
Figure 5: Participation rates of affected households before and after old
worker participation rate increase
The macroeconomic effects of this shock are displayed in Table 5. The positive
participation rate shock leads to some economic growth in the first decade which
manages to offset the negative effects of demographic change at least until 2040. At
this point the demographic effects start to dominate, leading to a decreasing GDP
per capita.
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Table 5: Macroeconomic Results of Old Workers Participation Rate
increase
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
GDPa 1.000 1.020 1.012 1.005 0.993 0.981
Capital Stocka 1.000 1.047 1.067 1.069 1.062 1.045
Share of Investmentb 0.318 0.312 0.295 0.284 0.276 0.271
Share of Consumptionb 0.552 0.561 0.576 0.586 0.593 0.596
Interest Rate 0.072 0.069 0.068 0.067 0.066 0.067
Income Tax rate 0.329 0.318 0.321 0.325 0.329 0.334
Contribution Rate 0.086 0.099 0.115 0.126 0.139 0.148
a Measured per capita (aged 20 and above) and indexed at 1 in 2020
b Share relative to total GDP
Table 11 in the Appendix displays the sectoral impact of population aging with an
increase of the participation rates of old workers. The results do not differ much
from the results without the shock, differences are marginal at best.
Table 12 displays the development of disaggregated wages with a participation rate
increase of old workers. Wages of old workers are around 1.5%-3% lower than in the
baseline scenario without a participation rate increase. This implies a reduction of
shortages in old labor in particular. However, despite the increase in labor supply,
wages still increase significantly, indicating that this participation rate increase
does not compensate the reduction in labor supply caused by the retirement of
baby-boomers.
4.3 Increasing the Retirement Age
The increase of the retirement age is implemented incrementally over two years and
contains two components. First, in the year 2021 pensions are not paid out to 65
year-olds anymore, thus increasing the statutory retirement age to 66. At the same
time, the preference parameter for leisure α of 65 year-olds is decreased by 30%.
This is necessary because the model neglects behavioral aspects in its definition of
the utility function and therefore the difference in income alone does not induce a
realistic increase in participation rates. In the year 2022, the statutory retirement
age is further increased to 67 and 66-year olds’ α is also reduced by 30%. After
both shocks are implemented, participation rates of 65 and 66 year-olds are on a
similar level as participation rates of 64 year-olds before the reform.2 The resulting
2This target can be considered as a likely upper bound for the true change in par-
ticipation rates. Assuming a lower participation rate might be more realistic, however
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effects on participation rates is displayed in the Appendix, Figure 13.
Table 6: Macroeconomic Results of retirement age increase
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
GDPa 1.000 1.019 1.011 1.005 0.995 0.986
Capital Stocka 1.000 1.051 1.071 1.076 1.071 1.058
Share of Investmentb 0.320 0.313 0.297 0.287 0.280 0.275
Share of Consumptionb 0.550 0.559 0.574 0.583 0.590 0.593
Interest Rate 0.072 0.069 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.066
Income Tax rate 0.329 0.318 0.321 0.324 0.328 0.332
Contribution Rate 0.086 0.083 0.099 0.109 0.120 0.129
a Measured per capita (aged 20 and above) and indexed at 1 in 2020
b Share relative to total GDP
Table 6 shows the macroeconomic outcomes of the retirement age increase. The
results are very similar to the participation rate increase discussed in the previous
section, in particular with respect to GDP per capita. The major difference is the
development of the contribution rate. Due to the increase of the retirement age,
the total amount of pensions paid out decreases which leads to a lower contribution
rate. It should also be noted that the size of pension payments is slightly lower
as well because the size of the pension is based on average lifetime labor income
and labor income at the age of 65 and 66 is below average. Additional results,
such as the development of wages and sectoral results are displayed in Appendix
C. Most notable here is that wages for most households are actually higher than
in the baseline scenario. This is caused by the higher net income due to lower
contribution rates and thereby higher consumption demand which also leads to a
higher demand for labor. Only wages of workers above the age of 64 are reduced
significantly, however this group only makes up a small share of the labor force,
even with the retirement age increase.
4.4 Increasing Participation Rates of Women
Since the model does not discriminate between male and female households, a
participation rate increase of women cannot be implemented directly. Instead, the
shock is implemented by multiplying the shock applied in Section 4.2 with the
full-time-equivalent share of women in each age group. This results in a shock
that is equivalent to the old age participation increase shock but applied to women
instead. The shock is applied to households between the ages of 28 and 64. The
without assumptions on early retirement schemes and the detailed formulation of the law
it is impossible to gauge the true extent of participation rate increases.
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lower bound is chosen because this is the point where participation rates between
men and women start to diverge. Participation rates of younger men and women
are almost identical. Appendix Figure 14 shows the resulting participation rate
responses for some representative age groups.
Table 7: Macroeconomic Results of women’s participation rate in-
crease
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
GDPa 1.000 1.019 1.011 1.003 0.991 0.980
Capital Stocka 1.000 1.047 1.066 1.069 1.062 1.045
Share of Investmentb 0.318 0.312 0.295 0.284 0.276 0.272
Share of Consumptionb 0.552 0.560 0.576 0.586 0.592 0.596
Interest Rate 0.072 0.069 0.068 0.067 0.066 0.067
Income Tax rate 0.329 0.319 0.322 0.326 0.330 0.335
Contribution Rate 0.086 0.099 0.115 0.126 0.139 0.148
a Measured per capita (aged 20 and above) and indexed at 1 in 2020
b Share relative to total GDP
The macroeconomic effects of this reform are displayed in Table 7. The effects are
almost identical to the increase in old workers’ participation rates but tend to be
marginally lower. Additional results, such as the development of wages and sectoral
results are displayed in Appendix C.
4.5 Comparison of the Scenarios
Figure 6 graphically compares the macroeconomic outcomes of the different sce-
narios presented above. The first panel compares the GDP per capita, which is
very similar across all scenarios. In the very long term the retirement age increase
performs slightly better but even then the differences are small. The capital stock
increases more with the retirement age increase than with the participation rate
increases while the shares of consumption and investment on GDP do not differ
significantly between the scenarios. The retirement age increase at first does not
affect the interest rate, however in the medium to longer term the interest rate con-
verges to the level achieved with the participation rate increases. Income tax rates
drop with all the reforms compared to the scenario without reform. In the short
and medium term the drops are the same across all reforms, in the longer term the
retirement age increase has the largest drop. Naturally, contribution rates to the
pension system are much lower in the retirement age increase scenario due to the
lower amount of pensions being paid out. As a direct consequence, the retirement
age reform leads to the largest positive effect on net incomes. However, all reforms
18
affect net income positively, despite partially decreasing wages. This indicates that
not only producers, but also consumers stand to benefit from all suggested reforms.
Figure 6: Development of macroeconomic variables in different scenarios
As can be observed in Figure 7, relatively speaking, the manufacturing and finance
sectors benefit more from a retirement age increase whereas other services and the
health sector benefit the least from a retirement age increase. Participation rate
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increases do not affect sectors very differently.
Figure 7: Development of sectoral shares in different scenarios
In a general equilibrium framework wages act as an equilibrating force for the labor
market. However, in reality one cannot expect extreme wage changes due to the
institutional framework, stickiness of wages and other reasons. Instead, the scarcity
of labor manifests itself in labor shortages. The size of the wage increases predicted
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by the model serve as an indicator for the extent of expected labor shortages.
Figure 8 compares aggregated wages in each sector across the different scenarios.
As has already been clear in the disaggregated view presented in the preceding
sections, the model predicts wages to rise significantly in all sectors during the
demographic transition. Despite the increase in labor supply due to 65 and 66 year
olds working more, the retirement age increase scenario predicts wages to increase
even more than the baseline scenario. This is due to the feedback effect of an
increase in output also increasing the demand for labor. Thus, in this scenario
the demand effect dominates the supply effect and the reform fails to reduce labor
shortages. Both participation rate increase scenarios reduce aggregated wages in all
sectors and almost all time periods, however, meaning that here the supply effect
dominates. The participation rate increase for old workers tends to be slightly more
effective than the corresponding participation rate increase for women.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
5.1 Sensitivity with respect to the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution
With a value of 0.9, the elasticity of substitution chosen for the baseline scenario
in this paper is higher than in most other studies. For example, Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987), Altig et al. (2001) and Kotlikoff et al. (2007) use 0.25, Keuschnigg
et al. (2011) use 0.35. Havranek et al. (2015) survey a large amount of studies
estimating this elasticity and find a mean of 0.5, however this result varies a lot
across country, data and methodology used. For Switzerland the mean is -0.434
based on 31 estimates, with observations ranging from -3.44 to 1.37. Most of these
results are not statistically significant. However, Havranek et al. (2015) also find
that in countries with higher GDP per capita and higher stock market participation
intertemporal elasticities of substitution tend to be higher.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is a very relevant parameter in a life-
cycle model because it directly affects the Euler equation and thereby the distribu-
tion of consumption across the life-cycle. In the context of population aging this
is particularly important because this determines how much old generations con-
sume. Figure 9 shows, how steady-state consumption across the life-cycle of very
high-skilled consumers is affected if lower elasticities of substitution are chosen. 3
It is clear that a lower elasticity leads to a shift in consumption from ages 50-80 to
3For ease of comparison, the version of the model shown in this chapter simplifies the
assumptions about initial participation rates somewhat, as the algorithm fails to find a
solution for some of the parameter values that are compared if initial participation rates
vary too much over the life-cycle. Therefore the baseline solution slightly differs from the
main model.
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Figure 8: Development of sectoral wages in different scenarios
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Figure 9: Life-cycle consumption pattern with different intertemporal elas-
ticities of substitution
age 80 and higher as well as to a lower extent 50 and lower. This stronger tendency
towards consumption smoothing also leads to a lower discount factor. How this
affects the model outcomes can be seen more clearly in Figure 10, where various
macroeconomic variables are compared along the demographic transition, as well
as Figure 11, where some sector-specific results are evaluated for selected indus-
tries4. In terms of GDP and capital stock per capita, the intertemporal eslasticity
of substitution matters a lot. Based on Figure 9 this is to be expected: if older
generations consume a lot and the population becomes older on average, then total
demand should be higher. With an elasticity of 0.25, GDP per capita increases by
15% during the demographic transition, even without assuming any technological
progress, whereas with an elasticity of 0.5 it remains roughly constant. Due to the
higher consumption of older generations, the total share of consumption is decreas-
ing with the IES, reflecting the need for higher savings. As a direct consequence,
interest rates decrease faster with a higher IES. Due to the higher GDP, tax and
contribution rates don’t increase as much with a higher IES. The sectoral results,
as displayed in Figure 11 also differ significantly depending on the choice of IES.
Wage rates in both sectors increase much more if a lower IES is chosen, reflecting
the better economic conditions due to the higher demand and therefore a higher
need for labor, increasing the scarcity on the labor market. How the sectors are
affected by the demographic change also changes. In particular, the share of the
health sector does not increase during the transition with very low elasticities. The
4For the sake of brevity I only report results for the health and construction sectors
which are the two sectors that are most strongly affected by the demographic change.
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Figure 10: Macroeconomic changes with different intertemporal elasticities
of substitution
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Figure 11: Sectoral changes with different intertemporal elasticities of sub-
stitution
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share of the construction sector is generally higher with higher IES, mostly due to
the higher demand for investments.
Given these large differences, the choice of IES matters a lot. I argue, that repli-
cating the true life-cycle pattern of consumption as closely as possible is the most
important factor when choosing an IES. The Swiss data show a decline in consump-
tion spending after age 65, i.e. the statutory retirement age. A perfect replication
of this pattern with the model used in this paper is not possible. Modeling of child-
rearing, as in, for example, Kotlikoff et al. (2007), would be necessary to reflect
this behavior. The IES of 0.9 used in the main specification of the model is the
closest approximation of true consumption patterns given the model at hand and
is therefore chosen as the main specification.
5.2 Sensitivity with respect to the elasticity of transforma-
tion between sector affiliation
The way in which sectoral labor supply is modeled in this paper necessitates a
somewhat arbitrary choice of the elasticity of transformation. As to my knowledge,
at the time of writing this paper no estimates of this elasticity are available, and even
if there are, the estimates would depend strongly on the aggregation of sectors. In
any case, choosing a sector to work in is an artificial construct which helps simplify
the model. In the real world, a choice of occupation is much more realistic. Magnani
and Mercenier (2009) simulate a dataset and calculate the resulting elasticity of
transformation between occupational choice. This results in elasticities in the range
of -1.375 to -1.7. In the baseline specification of this model I use a value of -1.5. In
this section I show how the results are affected if more extreme values of -1.1 and
-2 were chosen instead.
Figure 15 shows that macroeconomic variables are barely affected by the choice of
this parameter. However on the sectoral level, differences are expected. Indeed,
Figure 16 reveals that a higher (in absolute terms) elasticity of transformation
leads to reduced changes in the relative importance of sectors, whereas a lower
elasticity exacerbates the changes. This is expected as a higher elasticity means
that workers move across sectors more easily. At the same time a higher (lower)
elasticity of transformation leads to higher (lower) wage increases in the health
and wage decreases in the construction sector. Overall however, the differences are
fairly small and don’t affect the interpretation of model outcomes strongly.
5.3 Alternative Demographic Assumptions
The Swiss Statistical Office Federal Statistical Office (2020) introduces several alter-
native scenarios concerning the forecast of population developments in Switzerland.
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A number of these scenarios affect the available labor supply by changing assump-
tions concerning fertility or migration.5 In this section, I evaluate how different
assumptions affect the model outcomes and compare these changes to the effects
of participation rate or retirement age reforms. Table 8 describes the differences
between assumptions of the official scenarios presented in Federal Statistical Office
(2020).
Table 8: Alternative demographic assumptions
Scenario Children/woman Age at birth Immigration Emigration
Reference 1.62 33.4 165,000 130,000
High Fertility 1.82 32.9 165,000 130,000
Low Fertility 1.41 33.9 165,000 130,000
High Migration 1.62 33.4 190,000 140,000
Low Migration 1.62 33.4 140,000 120,000
Note: Assumed values in the year 2050. Source: Federal Statistical
Office (2020)
In the past, fertility has been steadily decreasing in Switzerland. The mean number
of children per woman has decreased from 2.07 in 1940 to 1.52 in 2010 and has in-
creased back to 1.54 since then, largely due to an increase in immigration. Mothers’
mean age at birth is fairly high and increasing, from 31.2 in 2009 to 32.2 in 2019.
Due to an improvement in childcare opportunities in recent years, Federal Statisti-
cal Office (2020) expects a slight increase in birth rates in the near future. In the
reference scenario, an increase from 1.52 children per woman in 2020 to 1.62 in 2050
is assumed. The mean age at birth is assumed to increase to 33.4 in 2050 due to a
higher share of tertiary educated women as well as improvements in reproductive
medicine. In the high fertility scenario the statistical office assumes that a more
dynamic family policy will lead to a moderate increase in the birth rate up to 1.82
in 2050. Due to more optimistic assumptions concerning the fertility of immigrated
women the mean age at birth is assumed to only increase slightly to 32.9 in 2050.
The low fertility scenario assumes a continuation of socioeconomic trends, i.e. an
increase in individualism and valuation of leisure and freedom, where many couples
do not marry or cannot afford children in combination with their desired lifestyle.
Hence, the birth rate is assumed to further decrease to 1.41 children per woman by
2050. Mean age at birth is assumed to further increase to 33.9.
Due to its relatively small population size and very attractive working conditions,
migrants play a very important role for the Swiss labor market. Current migration
trends are strongly linked to Switzerland joining the Schengen area in 2008, allowing
for free movement of labor from and to other Schengen countries. This has led net
5Assumptions concerning mortality only affect the labor supply of a developed country
marginally, as mortality rates of the working age population are extremely low with all
reasonable assumptions. Therefore, these assumptions are not discussed here.
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Figure 12: Impact of demographic assumptions on macroeconomic results
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migration to increase from a low of 36,000 in 2005 to a high of 98,000 in 2008. Since
then however, net migration decreased again to 55,000 in 2019. This decrease was
at first caused by a drop in immigration after the initial influx following the opening
of the borders, however more recently an increase in emigrations has been observed
as the main reason for the decrease in net migration. Due to the higher demand for
labor of Swiss firms caused by the demographic transition, the reference scenario
in Federal Statistical Office (2020) assumes the number of immigrants to increase
from 176’000 in 2020 to 185,000 in 2030 and then decrease again to 165’000 in 2050.
Due to immigrants returning to their home countries, emigrations are assumed to
slightly increase from 125,500 in 2020 to 130,000 in 2030 and then remain constant.
These numbers imply an initially slightly lower net migration of 50,500 which then
increases again to 55,000 in 2030 and in the long term falls to 35,000. In the high
migration scenario, the Swiss economy is assumed to continue growing while the
European economy stagnates. This leads to an initial increase in immigration to
210,000 in 2030. However, in the longer term the aging societies of the European
Union lead to a decrease of immigration to 190’000 in 2050. Due to the higher
amount of foreigners, emigration is assumed to increase to 140,000 emigrants per
year. In the low migration scenario, a rapid improvement of the economic situation
in the EU is assumed, leading to higher competition for labor and a worse economic
development in Switzerland. Immigrations reduce to 160,000 by 2030 and 140,000
in 2040. Emigrations are assumed to decrease to 120,000 emigrants per year.
Figure 12 shows how these alternative assumptions affect model outcomes. Dif-
fering assumptions concerning fertility only affect model outcomes in the longer
term, since it takes at least 20 years for newborns to enter the model as labor.
Even in the longer term, i.e. after 2050, they only change the model outcomes
marginally. Despite the higher (lower) labor supply with a higher (lower) fertility,
GDP per capita is not affected. Capital stock per capita is slightly lower (higher)
and contribution rates increase by less (more) because of the higher (lower) amount
of workers compared to the unchanged retired population. More interesting is the
effect of different migration scenarios. All indicators vary greatly depending on the
assumptions concerning migration. A lower net migration would lead to a much
more steep decline in GDP per capita, whereas a higher net migration comes close
to balancing out the effects of the demographic transition in terms of GDP per
capita. However, in terms of households’ disposable income, even the high migra-
tion scenario shows strong negative effects during the demographic transition. The
low migration scenario leads to a near constant supply of labor during the whole ob-
servation period. Note that even the low migration scenario still assumes a positive
net migration. Should net migration become neutral or even negative, for example
due to changing political conditions (e.g. Switzerland leaving the Schengen area),
this would lead to a decreasing labor supply in Switzerland and imply severe labor
shortages.
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6 Conclusion
In order to demonstrate the effects of demographic change on the Swiss labor market
and evaluate the consequences of an exogenous increase in participation rates I
develop a computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations. My
results show the negative impact of demographic change on the Swiss economy.
Especially after 2030, GDP per capita starts decreasing, with wages increasing
especially for young and middle-aged workers, and contribution rates to the PAYG
pension almost doubling by 2070. I also show that the relative production of health
services increases while the relative output of the construction sector decreases due
to aging induced shifts in consumption patterns and lower investments.
I proceed to implement different policy reform scenarios and show that even a
relatively modest increase in participation rates of women or older workers leads
to similar macroeconomic improvements as an increase in the retirement age by
two years. This highlights the importance of reducing labor shortages. It is also a
recommendation for policy makers to pursue policies that increase the participation
rates of women or old workers. Especially with regards to the political feasibility of
retirement age reforms, such reforms present a more easily achievable alternative.
It should be noted that there are many possible reforms that might be implemented
and are not considered in this paper. Due to the focus on labor market outcomes,
the pension and tax systems are not modeled with great detail. Especially alter-
native financing schemes for the pension (some of which are already implemented,
as noted in Section 3), as well as social security and the second and third pillar
of the pension system are not considered here. However, the goal of this paper
is not finding an ideal policy mix. Instead, I try to evaluate the efficacy of labor
market centered policies. In this respect, the relatively simple counterfactual sce-
nario of a statutory retirement age increase is well suited to gauge the importance
of the macroeconomic effects of a participation rate increase in comparison. The
costs, especially politically, of increasing the retirement age are well understood
and therefore suggesting a potentially less costly alternative with similar benefits is
important. Of course, an optimal policy response includes other measures as well.
Finding this optimal policy mix is left for future research. No matter what policy
mix is chosen however, the demographic transition will lead to massive economic
and cultural changes that cannot be offset by policy alone.
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P It−1
(44)
KSt+1 = It + (1− δ)KSt (45)
It = ((nt − 1) + δ)KSt (46)
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PGt Bt+1 +
∑
q
∑
g
PopQq,t,g
(
τWt ψq,t,g + τ
C
t P
C
q,t,gCq,t,g + τ
K
t it(Bq,t,g + Uq,t,g)
)
+
∑
s
Ms,tTs,tERtP0Ms = PGt Gt + (1 + it)
PGt
PGt−1
PGt−1Bt (47)
nTP
G
T BT +
∑
q
∑
g
PopQq,T,g
(
τWT ψq,T,g + τ
C
T P
C
q,T,gCq,T,g + τ
K
T iT (Bq,T,g + Uq,T,g)
)
+
∑
s
Ms,TTs,TERTP0Ms = PGT GT + (1 + iT−1)PGT BT (48)
PGt Bt+1 = ntPGt−1Bt (49)
PG,1−σ
G
t =
∑
s
αGs P
1−σG
s,t (50)
GSs,t = α
G
s
(
PGt
Ps,t
)σG
Gt (51)
Pq,t,gr = PR 1
45
45∑
g=1
ψq,t+gr−g,g (52)
CTRt =
∑
q
∑
gr PopQq,t,grPq,t,gr∑
q
∑
g PopQq,t,gψq,t,g
(53)
Ys,t − Exs,t +Ms,t =
∑
q
∑
g
PopQq,t,gC
S
s,q,t,g + I
S
s,t +G
S
s,t +
∑
s¯
SIs,s¯,t (54)
LSSs,q,a,t = L
AQ
s,q,a,t (55)
αKS0KSt =
∑
s
Ks,t (56)
∑
g
∑
q
PopQq,t+1,g+1(Bq,t+1,g+1 + Uq,t+1,g+1) = P It KSt+1 + PGt Bt+1 (57)
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B Additional Tables
Table 9: Sector aggregates
Sector NOGA Sections Code
Agriculture Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing A
Mining and Quarrying B
Manufacturing Manufacturing C
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Sup-
ply
D
Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste Management and
Remediation Activities
E
Construction Construction F
Trade & Transport Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Ve-
hicles and Motorcycles
G
Transportation and Storage H
IT Information and Communication J
Finance Financial and Insurance Activities K
Real Estate Activities L
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities M
Health Human Health and Social Work Activities Q
Other Services Accommodation and Food Service Activities I
Administrative and Support Service Activities N
Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory
Social Security
O
Education P
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation R
Other Service Activities S
C Additional Results
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Table 13: Sectoral Impact of Population Aging with retirement
age increase
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Manufacturing 29.83 29.85 29.71 29.64 29.58 29.53
Finance 20.83 21.12 21.30 21.38 21.43 21.41
Construction 6.81 6.62 6.37 6.21 6.11 6.05
Trade and Transport 18.40 18.46 18.55 18.62 18.67 18.70
IT 4.39 4.37 4.32 4.28 4.25 4.22
Other Services 12.75 12.62 12.69 12.76 12.81 12.87
Health 5.95 5.95 6.05 6.12 6.15 6.20
Agriculture 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Shares of sectoral output relative to aggregate output, in %.
Figure 13: Participation rates of affected households before and after retire-
ment age increase
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Table 11: Sectoral Impact of Population Aging with old workers
participation rate increase
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Manufacturing 29.81 29.83 29.68 29.60 29.53 29.48
Finance 20.82 21.05 21.23 21.30 21.35 21.32
Construction 6.79 6.61 6.34 6.18 6.06 6.00
Trade and Transport 18.42 18.48 18.58 18.65 18.71 18.74
IT 4.38 4.37 4.31 4.27 4.24 4.21
Other Services 12.78 12.66 12.74 12.82 12.88 12.96
Health 5.97 5.99 6.11 6.18 6.22 6.28
Agriculture 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Shares of sectoral output relative to aggregate output, in %.
Figure 14: Participation rates of affected households before and after
women’s participation rate increase
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Table 15: Sectoral Impact of Population Aging with women’s par-
ticipation rate increase
2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Manufacturing 29.81 29.83 29.69 29.60 29.54 29.48
Finance 20.82 21.07 21.25 21.32 21.37 21.34
Construction 6.79 6.61 6.34 6.18 6.07 6.01
Trade and Transport 18.41 18.47 18.57 18.64 18.70 18.73
IT 4.38 4.37 4.31 4.27 4.24 4.21
Other Services 12.77 12.65 12.73 12.81 12.87 12.95
Health 5.97 5.98 6.09 6.17 6.20 6.26
Agriculture 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Shares of sectoral output relative to aggregate output, in %.
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Figure 15: Macroeconomic changes with different elasticities of transforma-
tion between sectoral employment
45
Figure 16: Sectoral changes with different elasticities of transformation be-
tween sectoral employment
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